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ABSTRACT
The widespread use of automated decision processes in many areas
of our society raises serious ethical issues with respect to the fair-
ness of the process and the possible resulting discriminations. To
solve this issue, we propose a novel adversarial training approach
called GANSan for learning a sanitizer whose objective is to pre-
vent the possibility of any discrimination (i.e., direct and indirect)
based on a sensitive attribute by removing the attribute itself as
well as the existing correlations with the remaining attributes. Our
method GANSan is partially inspired by the powerful framework of
generative adversarial networks (in particular Cycle-GANs), which
offers a flexible way to learn a distribution empirically or to translate
between two different distributions. In contrast to prior work, one
of the strengths of our approach is that the sanitization is performed
in the same space as the original data by only modifying the other
attributes as little as possible, thus preserving the interpretability of
the sanitized data. Consequently, once the sanitizer is trained, it can
be applied to new data locally by an individual on his profile before
releasing it. Finally, experiments on a real datasets demonstrate the
effectiveness of the approach as well as the achievable trade-off
between fairness and utility.
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the availability and the diversity of large-scale
datasets, the algorithmic advancements in machine learning and
the increase in computational power have led to the development
of personalized services and prediction systems to such an extent
that their use is now ubiquitous in our society. For instance, machine
learning-based systems are now used in banking for assessing the
risk associated with loan applications [26], in hiring system [11]
and in predictive justice to quantify the recidivism risk of an in-
mate [5]. Despite their usefulness, the predictions performed by
these algorithms are not exempt from biases, and numerous cases of
discriminatory decisions have been reported over the last years.
For example, going back on the case of predictive justice, a study
conducted by ProPublica showed that the recidivism prediction tool
COMPAS, which is currently used in Broward County (Florida), is
strongly biased against black defendants, by displaying a false posi-
tive rate twice as high for black persons than for white persons [19].
If the dataset exhibits strong detectable biases towards a particu-
lar sensitive group (e.g., an ethnic or minority group), the naÃr´ve
solution of removing the attribute identifying the sensitive group
prevents only direct discrimination. Indeed, indirect discrimination
can still occur due to correlations between the sensitive attribute and
other attributes.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach called GANSan (for
Generative Adversarial Network Sanitizer) to address the problem
of discrimination due to the biased underlying data.
In a nutshell, our approach learns a sanitizer (in our case a neural
network) transforming the input data in a way that maximize the
following two metrics : (1) fidelity, in the sense that the transfor-
mation should modify the data as little as possible, and (2) non-
discrimination, which means that the sensitive attribute should be
difficult to predict from the sanitized data.
A typical use case might be one in which a company during its
recruitment process offers to job applicants a tool to remove racial
correlation in their data before submitting their sanitized profile on
the job application platform. If built appropriately, this tool would
make the recruitment process of the company free from racial dis-
crimination as it never had access to the original profile.
Overall, our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We propose a novel adversarial approach, inspired from Gen-
erative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [16], in which a san-
itizer is learned from data representing the population. The
sanitizer can then be applied on a profile in such way that the
sensitive attribute is removed, as well as existing correlations
with other attributes while ensuring that the sanitized profile
is modified as little as possible, preventing both direct and
indirect discrimination.
• Our objective is more generic than simply building a non-
discriminating classifier, in the sense that we aim at debiasing
the data with respect to the sensitive attribute. Thus, one of the
main benefits of our approach is that the sanitization can be
performed without having any knowledge regarding the tasks
that are going to be conducted in the future on the sanitized
data.
• Another strength of our approach is that once the sanitizer has
been learned, it can be used locally by an individual (e.g., on
a device under his control) to generate a modified version of
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his profile that still lives in the same representation space, but
from which it is very difficult to infer the sensitive attribute.
In this sense, our method can be considered to fall under the
category of randomized response techniques [35] as it can be
distributed before being used locally by a user to sanitize his
data. Thus, it does not require his true profile to be sent to
a trusted third party. Of all of the approaches that currently
exist in the literature to reach algorithmic fairness [14], we
are not aware of any other work that has considered the local
sanitization with the exception of [31], which focuses on the
protection of privacy but could also be applied to enhance
fairness.
• To demonstrate its usefulness, we have proposed and dis-
cussed four different evaluation scenarios and assessed our
approach on real datasets for these four different scenarios. In
particular, we have analyzed the achievable trade-off between
fairness and utility measured both in terms of the perturba-
tions introduced by the sanitization framework but also with
respect to the accuracy of a classifier learned on the sanitized
data.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, in Section 2, we in-
troduce the system model before reviewing the background notions
on fairness metrics. Afterwards, in Section 3, we review the related
work on methods for enhancing fairness belonging to the prepro-
cessing approach like ours before describing GANSan in Section 4.
Finally, we evaluate experimentally our approach in Section 5 before
concluding in Section 6.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first present the system model used in this paper
before reviewing the background notions on fairness metrics.
2.1 System model
In this paper, we consider the generic setting of a dataset D com-
posed of N records. Each record ri typically corresponds to the
profile of the individual i and is made of d attributes, which can
be categorical, discrete or continuous. Amongst those, the sensitive
attribute S (e.g., gender, ethnic origin, religious belief, . . . ) should
remain hidden to prevent discrimination. In addition, the decision
attribute Y is typically used for a classification task (e.g., accept or
reject an individual for a job interview). The other attributes of the
profile, which are neither S nor Y , will be referred hereafter as A.
For simplicity, in this work we restrict ourselves to the situa-
tions in which these two attributes are binary (i.e., S ∈ {0, 1} and
Y ∈ {0, 1} ). However, our approach can also be generalized to
multivalued attributes, although quantifying fairness for multivalued
attributes is much more challenging than for binary ones [23]. Our
main objective is to prevent the possibility of inferring the sensitive
attribute from the sanitized data.
This objective is similar to the protection against group member-
ship inference, which in our context amounts to distinguish between
the two groups generated by the values of S, which we will refer to
as the sensitive group (for which S = 0) and the default group (for
which S = 1).
2.2 Fairness metrics
First, we would like to point out that there are many different defi-
nitions of fairness existing in the literature [1, 6, 9, 14, 18, 33] and
that the choice of the appropriate definition is highly dependent of
the context considered.
For instance, one natural approach for defining fairness is the
concept of individual fairness [9], which states that individuals
that are similar except for the sensitive attribute should be treated
similarly (i.e, receive similar decisions). This notion relates to the
legal concept of disparate treatment [2], which occurs if the decision
process was made based on sensitive attributes. This definition is
relevant when discrimination is caused by the decision process.
Therefore, it cannot be used in the situation in which the objective is
to directly redress biases in the data.
In contrast to individual fairness, group fairness relies on statis-
tic of outcomes of the subgroups indexed by S and can be quanti-
fied in several ways, such as demographic parity [3] and equalized
odds [17]. More precisely, the demographic parity corresponds to
the absolute difference of rates of positive outcomes in the sensitive
and default groups (for which respectively S = 0 and S = 1):
DemoParity = |P(Y |S = 0) − P(Y |S = 1)|, (1)
while equalized odds is the absolute difference of odds in each
subgroup:
EqOddGapy =|Pr (Yˆ = 1|S = 0,Y = y)
− Pr (Yˆ = 1|S = 1,Y = y)| (2)
Compared to demographic parity, equalized odds is more suitable
when the base rates in both groups differ (P(Y = 1|S = 0) , P(Y =
1|S = 1)). Note that these definitions are agnostic to the cause of the
discrimination and are based solely on the assumption that statistics
of outcomes should be similar between subgroups.
In our work, we follow a different line of research by defining
fairness in terms of the inability to infer S from other attributes [12,
36]. This approach stems from the observation that it is impossible to
discriminate based on the sensitive attribute if the latter is unknown
and cannot be predicted from other attributes. Thus, our approach
aims at sanitizing the data in such a way that no classifier should be
able to infer the sensitive attribute from the sanitized data.
The inability to infer the attribute S can be measured by the
accuracy of a predictor Adv trained to recover the hidden S (sAcc),
as well as the balanced error rate (BER) introduced in [12]:
BER(Adv(A,Y ), s) = 12 (
1∑
s=0
P(Adv(A,Y ) , s|S = s)). (3)
The BER captures the predictability of both classes and a value
of
1
2 can be considered optimal for protecting against inference in
the sense that it means that the inferences made by the predictor
are not better than a random guess. In addition, the BER is more
relevant than the accuracy of a classifier sAcc at predicting the sensi-
tive attribute for datasets with imbalanced proportions of sensitive
and default groups. Thus, a successful sanitization would lead to a
significant drop of the accuracy while raising the BER close to its
optimal value of 0.5.
2
3 RELATED WORK
In recent years, many approaches have been developed to enhance
the fairness of machine learning algorithms. Most of these tech-
niques can be classified into three families of approaches, namely
(1) the preprocessing approach [10, 12, 24, 38] in which fairness
is achieved by changing the characteristics of the input data (e.g.
by suppressing undesired correlations with the sensitive attribute),
(2) the algorithmic modification approach (also sometimes called
constrained optimization) in which the learning algorithm is adapted
to ensure that it is fair by design [22, 37] and (3) the postprocessing
approach that modifies the output of the learning algorithm to in-
crease the level of fairness [17, 21]1. Due to the limited space and as
our approach falls within the preprocessing approach [10, 12, 24, 38]
in which fairness is achieved by changing the characteristics of the
input data (e.g. by suppressing undesired correlations with the sen-
sitive attribute), we will review afterwards only methods of this
category that makes use of an adversarial training.
Several approaches have been explored to enhance fairness based
on adversarial learning. For instance, Edwards and Storkey [10]
have trained an encoder to output a representation from which an
adversary is unable to predict the group membership, from which a
decoder can reconstruct the data and on which decision predictor still
performs well. Madras, Creager, Pitassi and Zemel [25] extended
this framework to satisfy the equality of opportunities constraint [17]
and explored the theoretical guarantees for fairness provided by the
learned representation as well as the ability of the representation
to be used for different classification tasks. Beutel, Chen, Zhao
and Chi [4] have studied the impact of data quality on fairness in
the context of adversarial learning, and demonstrated for instance
that learning a representation independent of the sensitive attribute
with a balanced dataset ensures statistical parity. Zhang, Lemoine
and Mitchell [39] have designed a decision predictor satisfying
group fairness by ensuring that an adversary is unable to infer the
sensitive attribute from the predicted outcome. McNamara, Ong and
Williamson [27] have investigated the benefits and drawbacks of fair
representation learning, demonstrating that techniques building fair
representations restrict the space of possible decisions, limiting the
usages of resulting data while providing fairness.
All these previous approaches does not preserve the interpretabil-
ity of the data, in the sense that the modified profile lives in a different
space than the original one. One notable exception is FairGan [36],
which maintains the interpretability of the profile. Their objective
is to learn a fair classifier on a dataset that has been generated such
that it is discrimination-free and whose distribution on attributes
is close to the original one. While FairGan generates a synthetic
dataset close to the original data while being discrimination free,
one key difference with GANSan is that FairGan cannot be used
to sanitize directly a particular profile. Following a similar line of
work, there is a growing body of research investigating the use
of adversarial training to protect the privacy of individuals during
the collection or disclosure of data. Feutry, Piantanida, Bengio and
Duhamel [13] have proposed an anonymization procedure based on
the learning of an encoder, an adversary and a label predictor. The
1We refer the interested reader to [14] for a recent survey comparing the different
fairness-enhancing methods.
authors have ensured the convergence of these three networks dur-
ing training by proposing an efficient optimization procedure with
bounds on the probability of misclassification. Pittaluga, Koppal
and Chakrabarti [29] have designed a procedure based on adver-
sarial training to hide a private attribute of a dataset. Romanelli,
Palamidessi and Chatzikokolakis [31] have designed a mechanism
to create a dataset preserving the original representation. They have
developed a method for learning an optimal privacy protection mech-
anism also inspired by GAN [32], which they have applied to loca-
tion privacy. The objective is to minimize the amount of information
(measured by the mutual information) preserved between S and the
prediction made on the decision attribute by a classifier while re-
specting a bound on utility. With respect to the local sanitization and
randomized response techniques, most of them are applied in the
context of privacy protection [34]. Our approach is among the first
that places the protection of information at the individual level as
the user can locally sanitize his data before publishing it.
4 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING FOR DATA
DEBIASING
As previously explained, removing the sensitive attribute is rarely
sufficient to guarantee non-discrimination as correlations are likely
to exist between other attributes and the sensitive one.
In general, detecting and suppressing complex correlations be-
tween attributes is a difficult task.
To address this challenge, our approach GANSan relies on the
modelling power of GANs to build a sanitizer that can cancel out
correlations with the sensitive attribute without requiring an explicit
model of those correlations. In particular, it exploits the capacity
of the discriminator to distinguish the subgroups indexed by the
sensitive attribute. Once the sanitizer has been trained, any individual
can apply it locally on his profile before disclosing it. The sanitized
data can then be safely used for any subsequent task.
4.1 Generative adversarial network sanitization
High level overview. Formally, given a dataset D, the objective
of GANSan is to learn a function San , called the sanitizer that
perturbs individual profiles of the dataset D, such that a distance
measure called the fidelity f id (in our case we will use the L2 norm)
between the original and the sanitized datasets (D¯ = San (D) =
{A¯, Y¯ }), is minimal, while ensuring that S cannot be recovered from
D¯. Our approach differs from classical conditional GAN [28] by
the fact that the objective of our discriminator is to reconstruct
the hidden sensitive attribute from the generator output, whereas
the discriminator in classical conditional GAN has to discriminate
between the generator output and samples from the true distribution.
Figure 1 presents the high-level overview of the training proce-
dure, while Algorithm 1 describes it in details.
The first step corresponds to the training of the sanitizer San
(Algorithm 1, Lines 7−17). The sanitizer can be seen as the generator
similarly to standard GAN but with a different purpose. In a nutshell,
it learns the empirical distribution of the sensitive attribute and
generate a new distribution that concurrently respects two objectives:
(1) finding a perturbation that will fool the discriminator in predicting
S while (2) minimizing the damage introduced by the sanitization.
More precisely, the sanitizer takes as input the original dataset D
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S: S Original.
Original data: D(S,Y ,A)
(Starting point)
Sanitizer (Generator San (D))
Sanitized data (D¯{Y¯ , A¯})
Discriminator Disc (D¯)
S¯: S predicted.
JDisc
JSan
Extract
Preprocessing
Predict S
Upd
Upd
Figure 1: Overview of the framework of GANSan . The objec-
tive of the discriminator is to predict S from the output of the
sanitizer D¯. The two objective functions that the framework
aims at minimizing are respectively the discriminator and sani-
tizer losses, namely JDisc and JSan .
(including S and Y) plus some noise Pz . The noise introduced is
used to prevent the over-specialization of the sanitizer on the training
set while making the reverse mapping of sanitized profiles to their
original versions more difficult as the mapping will be probabilistic
and not deterministic. As a result, even if the sanitizer is applied
twice on the same profile, it can produced two different modified
profiles.
The second step consists in training the discriminator Disc for
predicting the sensitive attribute from the data produced by the
sanitizer San(Algorithm 1, Lines 18 − 24). The rationale of our
approach is that the better the discriminator is at predicting the
sensitive attribute S, the worse the sanitizer is at hiding it and thus
the higher the potential risk of discrimination.
These two steps are run iteratively until convergence of the train-
ing.
Training objective of GANSan . Let S¯ be the prediction of S
by the discriminator (S¯ = Disc (San (D))). Its objective is to accu-
rately predict S, thus it aims at minimizing the loss JDisc (S, S¯) =
ddisc (S, S¯). In practice in our work, we instantiate ddisc as the Mean
Squared Error (MSE).
Given an hyperparameter α representing the desired trade-off
between the fairness and the fidelity, the sanitizer minimizes a loss
combining two objectives:
JSan (D, San , Disc ) =
α ∗ ds (S, S¯) + (1 − α) ∗ (dr (D, San (D)))
(4)
in which ds is 12 − BER(Disc (A,Y ), s) on the sensitive attribute. The
term 12 is due to the objective of maximizing the error of the discrim-
inator (i.e., recall that the optimal value of the BER is 0.5).
Concerning the reconstruction loss dr , we have first tried the
classical Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and MSE losses. However, our
Algorithm 1 GANSan Training Procedure
1: Inputs: D = {A, Y , S}, MaxEpochs, diter , batchSize, α
2: Output: San , Disc
▷ Initialization
3: San , Disc , Dataisc = shuffle(D)
4: Iterations = |D |batchSize
5: for e ∈ {1, .., MaxEpochs} do
6: for i ∈ {1, .., Iterations} do
7: Sample batch B of size batchSize from D
8: SB : extract S column from B
9: {A¯, Y¯ } = San (B)
10: eAi =
1
batchSize
·∑batchSizen=1 |Ani − A¯ni |
▷ Compute the reconstruction loss vector
11: ®J San = (1 − α ) · (eA1, eA2, eA3, ..., eAd , eY )T
▷ compute the sensitive loss
12: eS =
1
2 − BER(Disc (San (B), SB )
▷ concatenate the previously computed loss
13: ®J San = concat( ®J San, eS)
14: for loss ∈ ®J San do
▷ Back-propagation using loss
15: Backpropagate loss
16: Update San weights
17: end for
18: for l ∈ {1, .., diter } do
19: Sample batch B of size batchSize from Dataisc
20: SB : extract S column from B
21: Loss = MSE(SB , Disc (San (B)))
22: Backpropagate Loss
23: Update Disc weights
24: end for
25: end for
26: Save San and Disc states
27: end for
initial experiments have shown that these losses produce datasets that
are highly problematic in the sense that the sanitizer always outputs
the same profile whatever the input profile, which protects against
attribute inference but renders the profile unusable. Therefore, we
had to design a slightly more complex loss function. More precisely,
we chose not to merge the respective losses of these attributes (eAi =
(1−α) ∗ |Ai − A¯i |; A¯i ∈ A¯, i ∈ [1,d]), yielding a vector of attribute
losses whose components are iteratively used in the gradient descent.
Hence, each node of the output layer of the generator is optimized
to reconstruct a single attribute from the representation obtained
from the intermediate layers. The vector formulation of the loss is
as follows: ®JSan = (eA1 , eA2 , eA3 , ..., eAd , eY ,α ∗ ds (S, S¯))T and the
objective is to minimize all its components.
The details of the parameters used for the training are given in
Appendices A and B.
4.2 Performance metrics
The performance of GANSanwill be evaluated by taking into ac-
count the fairness enhancement and the fidelity to the original data.
With respect to fairness, we will quantify it primarily with the in-
ability of a predictor Adv, hereafter referred to as the adversary, in
inferring the sensitive attribute (cf. Section 2) using its Balanced
Error Rate (BER) [12] and its accuracy sAcc (cf., Section 2.2). We
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will also assess the fairness using metrics (cf. Section 2) such as
demographic parity (Equation 1) and equalized odds (Equation 2).
To measure the fidelity f id between the original and the sanitized
data, we have to rely on a notion of distance. More precisely, our
approach does not require any specific assumption on the distance
used, although it is conceivable that it may work better with some
than others. For the rest of this work, we will instantiate f id by the
L2-norm as it does not differentiate between attributes.
Note however that a high fidelity is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition to imply a good reconstruction of the dataset. In fact, as
mentioned previously early experiments showed that the sanitizer
might find a “median” profile to which it will map all input profiles.
Thus, to quantify the ability of the sanitizer to preserve the diversity
of the dataset, we introduce the diversity measure, which is defined
in the following way :
diversity =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
√∑d
k=1(rˆi,k − rˆ j,k )2
N × (N − 1) × √d
. (5)
While f id quantifies how different the original and the sanitized
datasets are, the diversity measures how diverse the profiles are in
each dataset. We will also provide a qualitative discussion of the
amount of damage for a given fidelity and fairness to provide a better
understanding of the qualitative meaning of the fidelity.
Finally, we evaluate the loss of utility induced by the sanitization
by relying on the accuracy yAcc of prediction on a classification task.
More precisely, the difference in yAcc between a classifier trained
on the original data and one trained on the sanitized data can be used
as a measure of the loss of utility introduced by the sanitization with
respect to the classification task.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the experimental setting used to evaluate
GANSan as well as the results obtained.
5.1 Experimental setting
Dataset description. We have evaluated our approach on two
datasets that are classical in the fairness litterature, namely the Adult
Census Income as well as on German Credit. Both are available on
the UCI repository2. Adult Census reports the financial situation of
individuals, with 45222 records after the removal of rows with empty
values. Each record is characterized by 15 attributes among which
we selected the gender (i.e., male or female) as the sensitive one and
the income level (i.e., over or below 50K$) as the decision. German
Credit is composed of 1000 applicants to a credit loan, described by
21 of their banking characteristics. Previous work [20] have found
that using the age as the sensitive attribute by binarizing it with a
threshold of 25 years to differentiate between old and young yields
the maximum discrimination based on DemoParity. In this dataset,
the decision attribute is the quality of the customer with respect to
his credit score (i.e., good or bad). Due to lack of space, we will
mostly discuss the results on Adult dataset in this section. However,
the results obtained on German credit were quite similar.
2https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/index.php
Training process. We will evaluateGANSan using metrics among
which the fidelity f id, the BER as well as the demographic parity
DemoParity (cf. Section 4.2). For this, we have conducted a 10-fold
cross-validation during which the dataset is divided into ten blocks.
During each fold, 8 blocks are used for the training, while another
one is retained as the validation set and the last one as the test set.
We computed the BER and sAcc using the internal discrimina-
tor of GANSan and three external classifiers independent of the
GANSan framework, namely Support Vector Machines (SVM) [7],
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) [30] and Gradient Boosting (GB) [15].
For all these external classifiers and all epochs, we report the space
of achievable points with respect to the fidelity/fairness trade-off.
Note that most approaches described in the related work (cf. Section
3) do not validate their results with independent external classifiers
trained outside of the sanitization procedure.
The fact that we rely on three different family of classifiers is not
fullproof, in the sense that it might exist another classifiers that we
have not tested that can do better, but it provides a higher confidence
on the strength of the sanitization than simply relying on the internal
discriminator.
For each fold and each value of α , we train the sanitizer during
40 epochs. At the end of each epoch, we save the state of the sani-
tizer and generate a sanitized dataset on which we compute the BER,
sAcc and f id . Afterwards, HeuristicA is used to select the sanitized
dataset that is closest to the “ideal point” (BER = 0.5, f id = 1).
More precisely, HeuristicA is defined as follows: BestEpoch =
min{(BERmin − 12 )
2 + f ide , f or e ∈ {1, . . . ,MaxEpoch}} with
BERmin referring to the minimum value of BER obtained with the
external classifiers. For each value of α ∈ [0, 1], HeuristicA se-
lects among the sanitizers saved at the end of each epoch, the one
achieving the highest fairness in terms of BER for the lowest damage.
We will use the three families of external classifiers for computing
yAcc, DemoParity and EqOddGap. We also used the same chosen
test set to conduct a detailed analysis of its reconstruction’s quality
(diversity and quantitative damage on attributes).
5.2 Evaluation scenarios
Recall that GANSan takes as input the whole original dataset (in-
cluding the sensitive and the decision attributes) and outputs a sani-
tized dataset (without the sensitive attribute) in the same space as the
original one, but from which it is impossible to infer the sensitive
attribute. In this context, the overall performance of GANSan can
be evaluated by analyzing the reachable space of points characteriz-
ing the trade-off between the fidelity f id to the original dataset and
the fairness enhancement. More precisely, during our experimental
evaluation, we will measure the fidelity between the original and
the sanitized data, as well as the diversity, both in relation with the
BER and sAcc, computed on this dataset.
However, in practice, our approach can be used in several situa-
tions that differ slightly from one another. In the following, we detail
four scenarios that we believe as representing most of the possible
use cases of GANSan . To ease the understanding, we will use the
following notation: the subscript tr (respectively ts) will denote the
data in the training set (respectively test set). For instance, {Z }tr
in which Z can either be A, Y , A¯ or Y¯ , represents respectively the
attributes of the original training set (not including the sensitive
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Dataset Adult Census German Credit
Group Protected (Sx = S0, Female) Default (Sx = S1, Male) Protected (Sx = S0, Young) Default (Sx = S1, Old)
Pr (S = Sx ) 36.21% 63.79% 19% 81%
Pr (Y = 1|S = Sx ) 11.35% 31.24% 57.89% 72.83%
Pr (Y = 1) 24.78% 70%
Table 1: Distribution of the different groups with respect to the protected attribute and the decision one for both the Adult Census
Income and the German Credit datasets.
and the decision attributes), the decision in the original training set,
the attributes the sanitized training set and the decision attribute in
the sanitized training set. Table 2 describes the composition of the
training and the testings sets for these four scenarios.
Table 2: Scenarios envisioned for the evaluation of GANSan .
Each set is composed of either the original attributes or their
sanitized versions, coupled with either the original or sanitized
decision.
Scenario
Train set composition Test set composition
A Y A Y
Baseline Original Original Original Original
Scenario 1 Sanitized Sanitized Sanitized Sanitized
Scenario 2 Sanitized Original Sanitized Original
Scenario 3 Sanitized Sanitized Original Original
Scenario 4 Original Original Sanitized Original
Scenario 1 : complete data debiasing. This setting corresponds
to the typical use of the sanitized dataset, which is the prediction of
a decision attribute through a classifier. The decision attribute is also
sanitized as we assumed that the original decision holds information
about the sensitive attribute. Here, we quantify the accuracy of
prediction of {Y¯ }ts as well as the discrimination represented by the
demographic parity (Equation 1) and equalized odds (Equation 2).
Scenario 2 : partial data debiasing. In this scenario, similarly to
the previous one, the training and the test sets are sanitized with the
exception that the sanitized decision in both these datasets {A¯, Y¯ } is
replaced with the original one {A¯,Y }. This scenario is generally the
one considered in the majority of paper on fairness enhancement [10,
25, 38], the accuracy loss in the prediction of the original decision
{Y }ts between this classifier and another trained on the original
dataset without modifications {A}tr is a straightforward way to
quantify the utility loss due to the sanitization.
Scenario 3 : building a fair classifier. This scenario was consid-
ered in [36] and is motivated by the fact that the sanitized dataset
might introduce some undesired perturbations (e.g., changing the
education level from Bachelor to PhD).
Thus, a third party might build a fair classifier but still apply
it directly on the unperturbed data to avoid the data sanitization
process and the associated risks. More precisely in this scenario, a
fair classifier is obtained by training it on the sanitized dataset {A¯}tr
to predict the sanitized decision {Y¯ }tr . Afterwards, this classifier is
tested on the original data ({A}ts ) by measuring its fairness through
the demographic parity (Equation 1, Section 2). We also compute
the accuracy of the fair classifier with respect to the original decision
of the test set {Y }ts .
Scenario 4 : local sanitization. The local sanitization scenario
corresponds to local use of the sanitizer by the individual himself.
For instance, the sanitizer could be used as part of a mobile phone
application providing individuals with a mean to remove some sen-
sitive attributes from their profile before disclosing it to an external
entity. In this scenario, we assume the existence of a biased classifier,
trained to predict the original decision {Y }tr on the original dataset
{A}tr . The user has no control on this classifier, but he is allowed
nonetheless to perform the sanitization locally on his profile before
submitting it to the existing classifier similarly to the recruitment
scenario discussed in the introduction. This classifier is applied on
the sanitized test set {A¯}ts and its accuracy is measured with respect
to the original decision {Y }ts as well as its fairness quantified by
DemoParity.
5.3 Experimental results
General results on Adult. Figure 2 describes the achievable trade-
off between fairness and fidelity obtained on Adult. First, we can
observe that fairness improves when α increased as expected. Even
with α = 0 (i.e., maximum utility with no focus on the fairness),
we cannot reach a perfect fidelity to the original data as we get at
most f idα=0 ≈ 0.982 (cf. Figure 2). Increasing the value of α from
0 to a low value such as 0.2 provides a fidelity close to the highest
possible (f idα=0.2 = 0.98), but leads to a BER that is poor (i.e., not
higher than 0.2). Nonetheless, we still have a fairness enhancement,
compared to the original data (f idor iд = 1, BER ≤ 0.15).
At the other extreme in which α = 1, the data is sanitized without
any consideration on the fidelity. In this case, the BER is optimal as
expected and the fidelity is 10% lower than the maximum achievable
(f idα=1 ≈ 0.88). However, slightly decreasing the value of α , such
as setting α = 0.96, allows the sanitizer to significantly remove
the unwarranted correlations (BER ≈ 0.45) with a cost of 2.24% on
fidelity (f idα=0.96 ≈ 0.95).
With respect to sAcc, the accuracy drops significantly when the
value of α increases 3. Here, the optimal value is the proportion of the
majority class, which GANSan renders the accuracy of predicting
S from the sanitized set closer to that value. However, even at the
extreme α = 1, it is nearly impossible to reach this optimal value.
Similarly to BER, slightly decreasing α from this extreme value by
setting α = 0.85 improves the sanitization while preserving a fidelity
closer to the maximum achievable.
The quantitative analysis with respect to the diversity is shown in
Figure 4. More precisely, the smallest drop of diversity obtained is
3.57%, which is achieved when we set α ≤ 0.2. Among all values of
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Figure 2: Fidelity/fairness trade-off on Adult. Each point represents the minimum possible BER of all the external classifiers. The
fairness improves with the increase of α , a small value providing a low fairness guarantee while a high one causes greater damage to
the sanitized data.
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Figure 3: Fidelity-fairness trade-off on Adult. Each point rep-
resents the minimum possible sAcc of all the external classifiers.
sAcc decreases with the increase of α , a small value providing
a low fairness guarantee while a larger one usually introduced
a higher damage. Remark that even with α = 0, a small dam-
age is to be expected. Points whose f idelity = 1 (lower right)
represent the BER on the original (i.e., unperturbed) dataset.
α , the biggest drop observed is 36%. The application of GANSan ,
therefore introduces an irreversible perturbation as observed with the
fidelity. This loss of diversity implies that the sanitization reinforces
the similarity between sanitized profiles as α increases, rendering
them almost identical or mapping the input profiles to a small number
of stereotypes. When α is in the range [0.98, 1[ (i.e., complete saniti-
zation), 75% of categorical attributes have a proportion of modified
records between 10 and 40% (cf. Figure 4).
For numerical attributes, we compute the relative change (RC)
normalized by the mean of the original and sanitized values:
RC =
|oriдinal − sanitized |
f (oriдinal , sanitized) (6)
f (oriдinal , sanitized) = |oriдinal | + |sanitized |2 (7)
We normalize the RC using the mean (since all values are positives)
as it allows us to handle situations in which the original values are
equal to 0. With the exception of the extreme sanitization (α = 1), at
least 70% of records in the dataset have a relative change lower than
0.25 for most of the numerical attributes. Selecting α = 0.9875 ≥
0.98 leads to 80% of records being modified with a relative change
less than 0.5 (c.f. Figure 9 in appendix C).
General results on German. Similarly to Adult, the protection
increases with α . More precisely α = 0 (maximum reconstruction)
achieves a fidelity of almost 0.96. The maximum protection of BER =
0.5 corresponds to a fidelity of 0.81 and a sensitive accuracy value
of sAcc = 0.76.
We can observe on Figure6 that most values are concentrated
on the 0.76 plateau, regardless of the fidelity and the value of α .
We believe this is due to the high disparity of the dataset. The
fairness on German credit is initially quite high, being close to 0.33.
Nonetheless, we can observe three interesting trade-offs on Figure5,
each located at a different shoulder of the Pareto front. These trade-
offs are A (BER ≈ 0.43, f id ≈ 0.94), B (BER ≈ 0.45, f id ≈ 0.84)
and C (BER ≈ 0.5, f id ≈ 0.81), each achievable with α = 0.6 for the
first one, and α = 0.9968 for the rest.
We review the diversity and the sanitization induced damage
on categorical attributes in Figure 7. As expected, the diversity
decreases with alpha, rendering most profiles identical with α = 1.
We can also observe some instabilities higher α values produce a
shallow range of diversities (i.e α ≥ 0.9) while smaller values have
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Figure 4: Boxplots of the quantitative analysis of sanitized datasets selected using HeuristicA. These metrics are computed on the
whole sanitized dataset. Modified records correspond to the proportion of records with categorical attributes affected by the sanitiza-
tion.
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Figure 5: Fidelity/fairness trade-off on German Credit.
a higher range of diversities. Such instability is mainly explained
by the size and the imbalance of the dataset, which does not allow
the sanitizer to correctly learn the distribution (such phenomenon is
common when training GANs with a small dataset). Nonetheless,
most of the diversity results prove close to the original one, that
is 0.51. The same trend is observed on the categorical attribute
damage. For most values of α , the median damage is below or
equal to 20%, meaning that we have to modify only two categorical
columns in a record to prevent remove unwanted correlations. For
the numerical damage, most columns have a relative change lower
than 0.5 for more than 70% of the dataset, regardless of the value
of α . Only columns Duration in month and Credit amount have a
higher damage. This is due to the fact that these columns have a
very large range of possible values compare to the other columns (33
and 921), especially for column Credit amount which also exhibit a
nearly uniform distribution. Our reference points A, B and C have a
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Figure 6: Fidelity-Fairness trade-off on German Credit. Each
point represents the minimum possible sAcc of all the external
classifiers.
median damage close than 10% for A and 20% for both B and C. The
damage on categorical columns are also acceptable.
To summarize our results, GANSan is able to maintain an im-
portant part of the dataset structure despite sanitization, making it
usable for other analysis tasks. However, at the individual level,
some perturbation might be more important on some profiles than
on others. A future work will investigate the relationship between
the position of the profile in distributions and the damage introduced.
For the different scenarios investigated hereafter, we fixed the value
of α to 0.9875, which provides nearly a perfect level of sensitive
attribute protection while leading to an acceptable damage on Adult.
Due to space limitations, we will not discussed results obtained on
German, the scenario analysis are available on the appendices D.2.
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Figure 7: Diversity and categorical damage on German.
Figure 8: Accuracy (blue), demographic parity gap (orange) and equalized odds gap (true positive rate in green and false positive rate
in red) computed for scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4 (top to bottom), with the classifiers GB, MLP and SVM (left to right) on Adult dataset.
The greater the value of α the better the fairness. Using only the sanitized data A¯ (S1, S2) increases the accuracy while a combination
of the original (A) and sanitized data (A¯) decreases it.
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Scenario 1 : complete data debiasing. In this scenario, we observe
that GANSan preserves the accuracy of the dataset. More precisely,
it increases the accuracy of the decision prediction on the sanitized
dataset for all classifiers (cf. Figure 8, Scenario S1), compared to the
original one which is 0.86, 0.84 and 0.78 respectively for GB, MLP
and SVM. This increase can be explained by the fact that GANSan
modifies the profiles to make them more coherent with the associated
decision, by removing correlations between the sensitive attribute
and the decision one. As a consequence, this sets the same decision
to similar profiles in both the protected and the default groups. In
fact, nearly the same distributions of decision attribute are observed
before and after the sanitization but some record’s decisions are
shifted (7.56% ± 1.23% of decision shifted in the sanitized whole set,
11.44%±2.74% of decision shifted in the sanitized sensitive group for
α = 0.9875). Such decision shift could be explained by the similarity
between those profiles to others with the opposite decisions in the
original dataset.
We also believe that the increase of accuracy is correlated with
the drop of diversity. More precisely, if profiles become similar to
each other, the decision boundary might be easier to find.
The discrimination is reduced as observed through DemoParity,
EqOddGap1 and EqOddGap0, which all exhibit a negative slope.
When correlations with the sensitive attribute are significantly re-
moved (α ⩾ 0.6), those metrics also significantly decrease. For
instance, at α = 0.9875, BER ≥ 0.48, yAcc = 0.96, DemoParity =
0.0453, EqOddGap1 = 0.0286 EqOddGap0 = 0.0062 for GB; whereas
as the original demographic parity gap and equalised odds gap are re-
spectively DemoParity = 0.16, EqOddGap1 = 0.083 EqOddGap0 =
0.060 (cf., Tables 5 and 6 in appendices for more details). In this
setup, FairGan [36] achieves a BER of 0.3862 ± 0036 an accuracy
of 0.82 ± 0.01 and a demographic parity of 0.04 ± 0.02.
Scenario 2 : partial data debiasing. Somewhat surprisingly, we
observe an increase in accuracy for most values of alpha. The demo-
graphic parity also decreases while the equalized odds remains nearly
constant (EqOddGap1, green line on Figure 8). Table 3 compare the
results obtained to other existing work from the state-of-the-art. We
include the classifier with the highest accuracy (MLP) and the one
with the lowest one (SVM). From these results, we can observe that
our method outperforms the others in terms of accuracy, but that the
lowest demographic parity is achieved with the method proposed
in [39] (DemoParity = 0.01), which is not surprising as this method
is precisely tailored to reduce this metric.
Even though our method is not specifically constrained to mitigate
the demographic parity, we can observe that it significantly improve
it. Thus, while partial data debiasing is not the best application
scenario for our approach as the original decision might be correlated
with the sensitive attribute, it still mitigates its effect to some extent.
Scenario 3 : building a fair classifier. The sanitizer helps to re-
duce discrimination based on the sensitive attribute, even when
using the original data on a classifier trained on the sanitized one.
As presented in the third row of Figure 8, as we force the system to
completely remove the unwarranted correlations, the discrimination
observed when classifying the original unperturbed data is reduced.
On the other hand, the accuracy exhibits here the highest negative
slope with respect to all the scenarios investigated. More precisely,
Table 3: Comparison with other works on the basis of accuracy
and demographic parity on Adult.
Authors yAcc DemoParity
LFR [38] 0.78 ≈ 0.02
ALFR [10] 0.825 ≈ 0.02
MUBAL [39] 0.82 0.01
LATR [25] 0.84 0.10
GANSan (S2) - MLP, α = 0.9875 0.91 ± 0.01 0.050 ± 0.02
GANSan (S2) - SVM, α = 0.9875 0.85 ± 0.04 0.048 ± 0.02
we observe a drop of 16% for the best classifier in terms of accu-
racy on the original set, which can be explained by the difference
of correlations between A and Y and between A¯ and Y¯ . As the fair
classifiers are trained on the sanitized set (A¯ and Y¯ ), the decision
boundary obtained is not relevant for A and Y .
FairGan [36], which also investigated this scenario achieved
yAcc = 0.82 and DemoParity = 0.05 ± 0.01 whereas our best classi-
fier in accuracy (GB) achievesyAcc = 0.72±0.033 andDemoParity =
0.12 ± 0.06 for α = 0.9875.
Scenario 4 : local sanitization. On this setup, we observe that
the discrimination is lowered as the α coefficient increases. Simi-
larly to other scenarios, the more the correlations with the sensitive
attribute are removed, the higher the drop of discrimination as quan-
tified by the DemoParity, EqOddGap1 as well as EqOddGap0, and
the lower the accuracy on the original decision attribute. For in-
stance, with GB, we obtain yAcc = 0.83 ± 0.039, DemoParity =
0.035 ± 0.022 at α = 0.9875 (the original values were yAcc = 0.86
and DemoParity = 0.16). With MLP which has the best DemoParity,
we observe: yAcc = 0.77± 0.060, DemoParity = 0.025± 0.017 This
proves that GANSan can be used locally, thus allowing users to
contribute to large datasets by sanitizing and sharing their informa-
tion without relying on any third party, with the guarantee that the
sensitive attribute GANSan has been trained for is removed.
The drop of accuracy due to the local sanitization is 3.68% on GB
(8% with MLP). Thus, for application requiring a time-consuming
training phase, using GANSan to sanitize profiles without retraining
the classifier seems to be a good compromise.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have introduced GANSan , a novel sanitization
method inspired by GANs achieving fairness by removing the corre-
lations between the sensitive attribute and the other attributes of the
profile. Our experiments demonstrate that GANSan can prevent the
inference of the sensitive attribute while limiting the loss of utility
as measured in terms of the accuracy of a classifier learned on the
sanitized data as well as by the damage on the numerical and cate-
gorical attributes. In addition, one of the strengths of our approach is
that it offers the possibility of local sanitization, by only modifying
the attributes as little as possible while preserving the space of the
original data (thus preserving interpretability). As a consequence,
GANSan is agnostic to subsequent use of data as the sanitized data
is not tied to a particular task.
While we have relied on three different types of external classifiers
for capturing the difficulty to infer the sensitive attribute from the
sanitized data, it is still possible that a more powerful classifier exists
that could infer the sensitive attribute with higher accuracy. Note
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that this is an inherent limitation of all the preprocessing techniques
and not only our approach. Nonetheless, as future work we would
like to investigate other families of learning algorithms to complete
the range of external classifiers.
Finally, much work still needs to be done to assess the relationship
between the different fairness notions, namely the impossibility of
inference and the individual and group fairness.
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APPENDICES
A PREPROCESSING OF DATASETS
The preprocessing step consists in first in one-hot encoding categori-
cal and numerical attributes with less than 5 values followed with a
scaling between 0 and 1.
In addition on Adult dataset, we need to apply a logarithm on
columns capital − дain and capital − loss prior any step because of
the fact that those attributes exhibit a distribution close to a Dirac
delta [8], with the maximal values being respectively 9999 and 4356,
and a median of 0 for both (respectively 91% and 95% of records
have a value of 0). Since most values are equal to 0, the sanitizer will
always nullify both attributes and the approach will not converge.
Afterwards, a postprocessing step consisting of reversing the prepro-
cessing ones is performed in order to remap the generated data to
the original shape.
B HYPER-PARAMETERS TUNING
Table 4 details the parameters of the classifiers that have yielded the
best results respectively on the Adult and German credit datasets.
The training rate represents the number of time for which an instance
is trained during a single iteration. For instance, for an iteration i,
the discriminator is trained with 100 ∗ 50 = 5000 records while
the sanitizer is trained with 1 ∗ 100 = 100 records. The number of
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iterations is equal to: iterations =
datasetsize
batchsize
. Our experiments
were run for a total of 40 epochs. We varied the α value using a
geometric progression: αi = 0.2 + 0.4
2i − 1
2i−1
; i ∈ {1, .., 10}
Table 4: Hyper parameters tuning for Adult dataset.
Sanitizer Discriminator
Layers 3x Linear 5x Linear
Learning Rate (LR) 2e − 4 2e − 4
Hidden Activation ReLU ReLU
Output Activation LeakyReLU LeakyReLU
Losses VectorLoss MSE
Training rates 1 50
Batch size 100 100
Optimizers Adam Adam
C EVALUATION OF ADULT
This appendix is composed of supplementary results of the evalua-
tion of the Adult dataset.
C.1 Numerical attribute Damage
Figure 9 summarizes the numerical damage on Adult computed with
the formula detailed in Appendix ??.
C.2 Evaluation of group-based discrimination
Table 5 summarizes the results obtained in terms of discrimination,
and table 6 presents the sensitive attribute level for all classifiers.
These results are computed with α = 0.9875.
Table 5: Equalized odds and demographic parity on Adult.
Clfs.
EqOddGap1
Baseline S1 S2 S3 S4
GB 0.0830 ± 0.0374 0.0286 ± 0.0253 0.1466 ± 0.0647 0.0966 ± 0.1044 0.1509 ± 0.0578
SVM 0.1809 ± 0.0323 0.0195 ± 0.0198 0.1249 ± 0.0668 0.1208 ± 0.0754 0.0854 ± 0.0525
MLP 0.0782 ± 0.0356 0.0266 ± 0.0176 0.1473 ± 0.0664 0.0487 ± 0.0383 0.1165 ± 0.0680
Clfs.
EqOddGap0
Baseline S1 S2 S3 S4
GB 0.0596 ± 0.0088 0.0062 ± 0.0050 0.0907 ± 0.0274 0.0557 ± 0.0482 0.0461 ± 0.0266
SVM 0.2778 ± 0.0174 0.0149 ± 0.0113 0.0830 ± 0.0293 0.1083 ± 0.0846 0.0402 ± 0.0273
MLP 0.0905 ± 0.0155 0.0065 ± 0.0051 0.0975 ± 0.0313 0.0695 ± 0.0274 0.0310 ± 0.0212
Clfs.
DemoParity
Baseline S1 S2 S3 S4
GB 0.1707 ± 0.0114 0.0453 ± 0.0261 0.0531 ± 0.0245 0.1111 ± 0.0594 0.0352 ± 0.0224
SVM 0.3709 ± 0.0139 0.0481 ± 0.0243 0.0480 ± 0.0258 0.1910 ± 0.0845 0.0510 ± 0.0234
MLP 0.1936 ± 0.0209 0.0458 ± 0.0258 0.0508 ± 0.0253 0.0616 ± 0.0466 0.0254 ± 0.0170
Table 6: Evaluation of GANSan ’s sensitive attribute protection
on Adult.
Clfs.
BER sAcc
Baseline Sanitized Baseline Sanitized
GB 0.1637 ± 0.0094 0.4803 ± 0.0173 0.8530 ± 0.0074 0.6841 ± 0.0105
MLP 0.1818 ± 0.0096 0.4756 ± 0.0224 0.8423 ± 0.0034 0.6803 ± 0.0105
SVM 0.1431 ± 0.0047 0.4654 ± 0.0115 0.8255 ± 0.0052 0.5494 ± 0.0386
C.3 Utility of GANSan
We present in Table 7 the utility of GANSan as measured in terms of
the accuracy on the decision prediction, the fidelity and the diversity
on Adult.
Table 7: Evaluation of GANSan ’s utility on adult Census.
Clfs.
yAcc
Baseline S1 S2 S3 S4
GB 0.8631 ± 0.0039 0.9650 ± 0.0129 0.9119 ± 0.0116 0.7244 ± 0.0380 0.8313 ± 0.0397
SVM 0.7758 ± 0.0061 0.8895 ± 0.0502 0.8489 ± 0.0476 0.7368 ± 0.0249 0.6605 ± 0.0649
MLP 0.8384 ± 0.0030 0.9685 ± 0.0107 0.9143 ± 0.0136 0.6008 ± 0.0464 0.7724 ± 0.0638
fid diversity
Baseline S1 Baseline S1
0.852 ± 0.00 0.9428 ± 0.0025 0.2905 0.2483 ± 0.0070
C.4 Qualitative observation of GANSan output
on Adult
In Tables 8 and 9, we present the records that have been maximally
and minimally damaged due to the sanitization.
Table 8: Most damaged profiles for α = 0.9875 on the first and
the fourth folds. Only the perturbed attributes are shown.
Attrs Original Fold 1 Original Fold 4
age 42 49.58 29 49.01
workclass State Federal Self-emp-not-inc Without-pay
fnlwgt 218948 192102.77 341672 357523.5
education Doctorate Bachelors HS-grad Doctorate
education-num 16 9.393 9 7.674
marital-status Divorced Married-civ-spouse Married-spouse-absent Married-civ-spouse
occupation Prof-specialty Adm-Clerical Transport-moving Protective-serv
relationship Unmarried Husband Other-relative Husband
race Black White Asian-Pac-Islander Black
hours-per-week 36 47.04 50 40.37
native-country Jamaica Peru India Thailand
damage value − 3.7706 India Thailand
Table 9: Minimally damaged profile, profile with damage at 50%
of the max at α = 0.9875 for the first fold.
Attrs Original Damaдe = 0.0291 Original Damaдe = 1.8845
age 49 49.4 35 29.768
workclass Federal-gov Federal-gov Private Private
fnlwgt 157569 193388 241998 179164
education HS-grad HS-grad HS-grad HS-grad
education-num 9 9.102 9 8.2765
marital-status Married-civ-spouse Married-civ-spouse Never-married Never-married
occupation Adm-Clerical Adm-Clerical Sales Farming-fishing
relationship Husband Husband Not-in-Family Not-in-Family
race White White White White
capital-gain 0 0 8.474 0
capital-loss 0 0 0 0
hours-per-week 46 44.67 40 42.434
native-country United-States United-States United-States United-States
income 0 0 1 0
D EVALUATION OF GERMAN CREDIT
In this appendix, we will discuss the results obtained on German
credit dataset. First, we present the dataset distribution (Table 10).
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Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of the relative change (x-axis) for numerical attributes, versus the proportion of records affected
in the dataset (y-axis).
Figure 10: Relative change
Table 10: Distribution of the different groups with respect to the
sensitive attribute and the decision one on German credit.
Dataset German Credit
Group Sensitive (Sx = S0, Young) Default (Sx = S1, Old)
Pr (S = Sx ) 19% 81%
Pr (Y = 1|S = Sx ) 57.89% 72.83%
Pr (Y = 1) 70%
D.1 Damage and qualitative analysis
Looking at the numerical columns damage (Figure10), we can ob-
serve that most columns have a relative change lower than 0.5 for
more than 70% of the dataset, regardless of the value of α . Only
columns Duration in month and Credit amount have a higher dam-
age. This is due to the fact that these columns have a very large
range of possible values compare to the other columns (33 and 921),
especially for column Credit amount which also exhibit a nearly
uniform distribution.
Table 11: Evaluation of GANSan ’s protection on test. Values
for reference points A, B and C
Classifier Original A: α = 0.6 B, C: α = 0.9968
GB 0.3652 ± 0.0402 0.4160 ± 0.0590 0.4549 ± 0.0411
MLP 0.3723 ± 0.0352 0.3981 ± 0.0537 0.4428 ± 0.0547
SVM 0.2521 ± 0.0434 0.2868 ± 0.0760 0.3243 ± 0.0469
D.2 Evaluation scenario, other fairness metrics
and utilities
In Figure11, we present the results on the differents scenario investi-
gated (S1: complete debiasing, S2: partial debiasing, S3: buiding a
fair classifier, S4: local sanitization).
First off all, we can observe that for all scenario, the accuracy is
mostly stable with the increase of α for all classifiers. The sanitiza-
tion does not significantly affect the quality of prediction, which is
mostly around 75%, 7.143% greater than the proportion of the posi-
tive outcomes in the dataset. On scenario S3 and S4 This observation
comes into contrast to adult, where the accuracy decrease with the
increase of the protection coefficient.
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Figure 11: Accuracy (blue), demographic parity gap (orange) and equalized odds gap (true positive rate in green and false positive
rate in red) computed for scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4 (top to bottom), with the classifiers GB, MLP and SVM (left to right on german
credit dataset).
If we take a closer look at the fairness metrics as provided in
Figure12, we observe that the DemoParity and EqOddGap1 have a
negative slope, which increase with α . In constrast, EqOddGap0 is
rather unstable, especially when α > 0.8.
S1: complete data debiasing. In this scenario, we observe that the
sanitization makes render the profiles in each decision group easily
seperable, which in turn improve the accuracy as we can observe.
The sanitization also reduces the risk of discrimination, just as we
have seen on the Adult dataset.
S2: partial data debiasing. : Even though the sanitized and origi-
nal decisions does not share the same distribution, the sanitization
is able to transform the dataset in such way that it improves the
classifications performances of all classifiers. The discrimination on
the other hand is almost constant, meaning that the original decision
still preserve a certain amount of discrimination that is harder to
remove on not sensitive attributes alone, especially on small dataset.
S3: building a fair classifier. : Just as the results observed on
Adult dataset, building a fair classifier by training it on sanitized
data and testing/using it on unprocessed data proved to be less
conservative of the accuracy. We observe a slight drop, from 0.75
to almost 0.65 for the first value of α , then it stays stable across
all α . There decision boundaries learned by the fair classifier can
not be directly transfered on another type of data as they do not
share the same distribution. Concerning the fairness metrics, we
observe two behaviour: for α ≤ 0.9 the fairness metrics are nearly
constants in constrast to adult where they all seems to increase; the
discrimination is reduced when we push the system close to the
maximum (α > 0.9), but not to the extreme where the discrimination
increases. The increase for extrÃłme values is due to the fact that
the sanitization has almost completely perturbed the dataset, losing
all of its structure. Thus, as this set is highly imbalanced both on
the sensitive attribute distribution as well as the decision one, all
classifiers to predict the majority labels which are in favor of the
default group (c.f. Table 10).
S4: local sanitization. On this dataset, this scenario provides the
most significant results. As a matter of fact, the accuracy of the
classifier is almost not affected by the sanitization, while the discrim-
ination is reduced. MLP provides the most unstable EqOddGap0,
and for all classifiers, we observe a reduction of DemoParity and
EqOddGap0, which become significantly important with higher val-
ues of α (α > 0.8). This result is differents from Adult, where we
observed a negative slope. An deeper analysis of such behaviour is
left out as another research objective.
Table 12 provides the quantitative results for these 4 scenario on
values of α that correspond to points A and B.
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Figure 12: Fairness metrics evaluated on different scenatio on german credit dataset.
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Table 12: GANSan quantitative results on german credit dataset
α Classifier
EqOddGap1
Baseline S1 S2 S3 S4
0.6
GB 0.0681 ± 0.0977 0.0394 ± 0.1271 0.0345 ± 0.1209 0.0283 ± 0.1209 0.0258 ± 0.0784
MLP 0.0910 ± 0.1323 0.0316 ± 0.1208 0.0207 ± 0.1190 0.0952 ± 0.1448 0.1249 ± 0.1666
SVM 0.1415 ± 0.1391 0.1421 ± 0.1488 0.1207 ± 0.1558 0.1133 ± 0.1103 0.1556 ± 0.1175
0.99688
GB 0.0681 ± 0.0977 0.0904 ± 0.0960 0.0871 ± 0.0877 0.0131 ± 0.1875 0.0607 ± 0.0781
MLP 0.0910 ± 0.1323 0.0598 ± 0.0968 0.0898 ± 0.0795 0.1404 ± 0.2049 0.1425 ± 0.0898
SVM 0.1415 ± 0.1391 0.1184 ± 0.1593 0.1012 ± 0.1465 0.1520 ± 0.1500 0.1625 ± 0.1186
α Classifier
EqOddGap0
Baseline S1 S2 S3 S4
0.6
GB 0.0215 ± 0.2685 0.0383 ± 0.2317 0.0407 ± 0.2186 0.0046 ± 0.2291 0.0993 ± 0.2257
MLP 0.0362 ± 0.2094 0.0111 ± 0.1910 0.0087 ± 0.1907 0.0205 ± 0.2038 0.0330 ± 0.2551
SVM 0.0229 ± 0.2605 0.0140 ± 0.2635 0.0186 ± 0.2690 0.0380 ± 0.2311 0.0153 ± 0.2292
0.99688
GB 0.0215 ± 0.2685 0.1153 ± 0.1692 0.1720 ± 0.1889 0.0730 ± 0.2927 0.0616 ± 0.2389
MLP 0.0362 ± 0.2094 0.0862 ± 0.1895 0.0813 ± 0.1696 0.0822 ± 0.1812 0.0181 ± 0.2855
SVM 0.0229 ± 0.2605 0.0922 ± 0.1803 0.1124 ± 0.1813 0.0944 ± 0.1653 0.0491 ± 0.1876
α Classifier
DemoParity
Baseline S1 S2 S3 S4
0.6
GB 0.1028 ± 0.1048 0.1204 ± 0.1321 0.1097 ± 0.1291 0.0533 ± 0.1087 0.0390 ± 0.1034
MLP 0.0914 ± 0.1032 0.1115 ± 0.1318 0.0912 ± 0.1400 0.0991 ± 0.1381 0.1258 ± 0.1446
SVM 0.1519 ± 0.1456 0.1715 ± 0.1810 0.1426 ± 0.1935 0.1273 ± 0.1371 0.1692 ± 0.1573
0.99688
GB 0.1028 ± 0.1048 0.2109 ± 0.1887 0.2119 ± 0.0784 0.0162 ± 0.1510 0.0771 ± 0.1161
MLP 0.0914 ± 0.1032 0.1792 ± 0.0883 0.1847 ± 0.0709 0.1290 ± 0.1390 0.1449 ± 0.1118
SVM 0.1519 ± 0.1456 0.2130 ± 0.0962 0.1887 ± 0.1032 0.1559 ± 0.1111 0.1745 ± 0.1145
α Classifier
yAcc
Baseline S1 S2 S3 S4
0.6
GB 0.764 ± 0.0566 0.8311 ± 0.0558 0.0477 ± 0.0548 0.6911 ± 0.0521 0.7680 ± 0.0483
MLP 0.733 ± 0.0267 0.8167 ± 0.0469 0.8230 ± 0.0485 0.6900 ± 0.0412 0.7600 ± 0.0589
SVM 0.714 ± 0.0255 0.7500 ± 0.0477 0.7550 ± 0.0477 0.6789 ± 0.0511 0.7300 ± 0.0494
0.99688
GB 0.764 ± 0.0566 0.8912 ± 0.0491 0.8670 ± 0.0606 0.6788 ± 0.1123 0.7500 ± 0.0658
MLP 0.733 ± 0.0267 0.8938 ± 0.0350 0.8720 ± 0.0533 0.6725 ± 0.0886 0.7520 ± 0.0408
SVM 0.714 ± 0.0255 0.8325 ± 0.0373 0.8060 ± 0.0743 0.6700 ± 0.1013 0.7580 ± 0.0496
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